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1 Introduction
The hope is widespread that the Internet will provide a powerful new tool in the battle
against global poverty. These sentiments were echoed in the G-8’s recent Charter on the
Global Information Society that declared:
Information and Communications Technology (IT) is one of the most
potent forces in shaping the twenty-first century ... IT is fast becoming a
vital engine of growth for the world economy ... Enormous opportunities
are there to be seized and shared by us all (G-8 2000).
To back these claims, there is mounting anecdotal, econometric and theoretical support
for the role of information technology in growth and development. This paper does not
dispute such evidence. Because of the scale of the improvement over previous
communications tools, the invention of the Internet might lead to a significant impact on
growth through better functioning of markets and firms. Added to such effects are those
working within the sector itself—in particular the impact of network externalities,
whereby the value of a connection to a network such as the telephone or Internet rises as
others join the network. Beyond the theoretical, the increasing power for a given cost of
computers has shown up significantly in US productivity figures. Businesses and jobs
have been created, economies have gained, schools have acquired new pedagogical
tools, NGOs and pressure groups have exploited the technology to further agendas. And
it is likely that this impact will grow worldwide.
This paper does take a slightly more sceptical look at the likely impact of the Internet on
long-term economic growth rates in developing countries, however. It is, of course, too
early for there to be any firm answers about the relationship between the Internet and
economic development in LDCs,1 but this paper attempts to suggest likely orders of
magnitude for such an impact. The results of such an exercise are perhaps worrying for
those pinning LDC growth prospects on ICT rollout.
The paper is divided into four sections: a discussion of the theoretical role of technology
in growth and the theoretical case for the Internet as a growth-inducing technology;
evidence of the Internet’s impact on growth rates in the US and OECD; the
appropriateness of the Internet as a growth-promoting technology for LDCs; and
estimates of future impacts in LDCs and a look at the past impact of individual
communications technologies on worldwide growth rates.
1 For example, cross-country econometric evidence on the impact of the Internet itself on economic
growth or firm productivity is sparse to non-existent given the fact that the technology is so young. Altig
and Rupert (1999) try a novel approach, estimating the impact of 1999 Internet users as a percentage of
population on GDP growth between 1974-92 controlling for 1950 income per capita (from this, they
estimate that 100 per cent Internet usage would be associated with about 4 per cent per annum additional
economic growth). Concerns over the direction of causality in this study must throw some doubt on their
conclusions, however.2
2 Theories of economic growth: Does technology cause growth?
Is the Internet a likely candidate?
The Internet is a highly efficient tool for transferring information—email, for example,
is cheaper than a telephone call, leaves an electronic record and can be ‘broadcast’
simultaneously to many recipients. Further, the Internet is a technology which benefits
from network externalities—my use of the system increases its value to others, by
providing another partner in the web information transfer.
The Internet appears a good candidate as a technology that causes growth, then. And
given that most recent theories of economic growth suggest a significant role for
technological change (differing rates of broad technological adaptation are, for example,
the driving force behind divergence in Romer’s (1990) popular model), the impact of
the Internet on growth might be substantial.
The definition of ‘technology’ used by Romer or by growth accountants in general
spreads far beyond ‘physical things that are invented,’ however. This is because,
especially in most empirical discussions of economic growth, the impact of
‘technology’ is measured through estimates of total factor productivity (TFP). Growth
accounting procedures measure increases in stocks of physical capital (the quantity of
assets such as factories and roads measured by their dollar value), of human capital (the
education stock, usually measured by average years of schooling) and of labour
(measured in numbers of people of working age). The procedures then estimate how
much output growth can be ‘expected’ from such increases in capital and labour stocks.
Total factor productivity (TFP) is defined as the actual measured growth of output
minus the growth rate expected from increases in capital and labour stocks. As a
measure of the efficiency with which capital and labour are combined to produce
output, TFP is calculated as the residual from a growth accounting exercise.2
As such, as well as new inventions, ‘technology’ as defined by growth accountants
includes ‘business technology’ (management techniques and systems) ‘political
technology’ (forms of government and institutions) and ‘social technology’ (modes of
human interaction)—indeed, it includes everything that might affect output which isn’t
2 ‘Technology’ as defined by TFP is open to a wide range of assumptions about the importance of
various factors to output that can dramatically alter its aggregate size, then. Calculating the scale of TFP
growth is a process laden with more or less arbitrary decisions that can dramatically alter results.
Depending what is defined as ‘physical capital,’ (and what we define as the labor stock), how we measure
the growth of the stock of capital, what we measure as ‘human capital,’ whether we include measures of
‘natural capital’ or ‘social capital,’ what (if any) allowances we make for technological change
‘embodied’ in capital investment, or market failures such as scale effects, whether we believe that capital
can be substituted for labour one-for-one, what share we give to human over physical capital in output
estimates and a range of other more-or-less arbitrary assumptions, we can come up with markedly
different estimates for the residual from a growth accounting equation which is defined as ‘total factor
productivity’. For example, one recent study looked at the impact of changing just two of these
assumptions within reasonable bounds on long-term TFP growth in Korea, and produced estimates of
annual growth 1960-97 that ranged between 3.0 per cent of GDP and -1.4 per cent (The two were
assumptions about returns to scale and shares of physical and human capital) (Ghosh and Kraay 2000).
This sensitivity of technology’s estimated impact on growth to a range of more or less arbitrary
assumptions is why, for example, the extent to which it has been important in practice in regions like East
Asia remains hotly debated. Felipe (1999) concludes his survey of TFP growth and capital accumulation
in East Asia by noting ‘this work has become a war of figures ... It seems that re-working the data one can
show almost anything’.3
physical (and sometimes educational) capital or labour, including factors such as market
power, increasing returns, technical complementarities, excess capacity, unmeasured
fluctuations in work effort and hours, and other errors in measurement.
Because ‘technology’ as defined by TFP equations is very broad, including far more
than technology ‘embodied’ in physical capital, it might be that the effect of each
individual technological advance is small and/or that other types of technology are more
important for sustained growth than ‘formally’ invented, embodied (physical),
technologies such as the Internet. Indeed, Paul Romer argues that ‘technologies’ such as
Wal-Mart’s management of inventory data—not invented under an R&D programme—
are probably more significant than inventions such as the transistor (Perkins and Perkins
1999). The Internet might also have less impact than the invention of ‘just in time’
management, for example.3
Thus, technology ‘broadly defined’ as it is in TFP calculations covers a multitude of
factors beyond ‘inventions,’ such as the Internet policies, institutions, social
relationships, and these other factors might be more important in determining growth
than all inventions, let alone the impact of just one such as the Internet. This paper now
turns to evidence from the United States and the OECD regarding the impact of
computers in general and the Internet in particular on economic growth.
3 Evidence on computers, the Internet and economic growth
in the US and OECD
This section will briefly review the evidence linking an uptick in TFP in the United
States in the last few years to the expansion in computer use and utility, and will
evaluate the likely future productivity impact of the Internet. It concludes that there is
evidence for a link, but not for significant spillovers (TFP increases outside the
computer manufacturing sector) necessary for computers to have a major impact on
long-term growth rates.
At the micro level, Lehr and Lichtenberg (1999) claim there have been excess returns to
investments in computers across a range of industries compared to other types of capital
(in the US), especially in the presence of skilled labour. Further, some argue that the
impact of the IT revolution is at last beginning to be felt at the macro level. A recent
‘survey of surveys’ (Pohjola 1998) concluded that in the 1980s and the early 1990s, the
consistent finding was that there was a broadly negative correlation between IT
investment and economy-wide productivity in the United States. A few studies in the
late 1990s began to reverse this conclusion, however. Some of the more optimistic
studies looking at the 1996-99 period suggest that computer hardware is responsible for
between 0.49 to 0.82 per cent of US output growth in that period, and a significant
percentage of productivity improvements (see Yusuf 2000).
3 One reason to believe that technologies like the Internet that are traditionally ‘researched and
developed’ cannot be a central cause of the process of economic growth is that the number of
scientists and engineers employed in R&D in the US has increased fivefold 1950-90, while US growth
rates have fallen over that period (Keely and Quah 1998).4
This evidence has been disputed, however. ‘Excess’ micro-level returns apparently
disappear when other factors, including company reorganization, are taken into account
(David 2000).4 Robert Gordon (2000) presents macro evidence that computers and the
Internet do not represent a dramatic leap forward in productivity outside the durables
manufacturing sector. He disaggregates the recent uptick of 1.35 per cent in US TFP
growth into 0.54 per cent of cyclical effects and 0.81 per cent of trend growth accounted
for by the durable manufacturing sector—including computers, peripherals and
telecommunications.5 In the 88 per cent of the private economy outside of durables,
TFP growth has actually decelerated—suggesting that there is no evidence of a
spillover effect from computers.
Looking at labour productivity over a slightly longer span, IT-intensive industries
outside the IT sector itself are some of the worst performing.6 America’s TFP change
has averaged around 4 per cent in mining over the 1987-97 period, compared to close
to -4 per cent per year in the banking sector; this despite the fact that IT spending as a
percentage of output was highest in banking amongst the industries covered and second
lowest (after construction) in mining (Economist, 23 September 2000).7 This all
suggests the ‘Solow paradox’—widespread evidence of computer use, little evidence of
(widespread) productivity growth—continues, at least in modified form.
It should also be a concern that the share of ICTs in capital stock is fairly significant in a
number of other OECD countries, and yet they have seen no increase in productivity.
Broadly, the evidence from a recent study of OECD countries by Paul Schreyer (2000)
finds that, as with the United States, ICT capital goods have seen rapid improvements in
the ratio of price to performance and as a result there has been a significant substitution
of ICT capital for other types of capital and labour inputs. ITC’s share of nominal
productive capital stock increased from 2.4 to 3.2 per cent in France, 1.2 to 2.3 in Japan,
and 3.6 to 5.2 in the UK in the 1985-96 period (compared to 6.2 to 7.4 in the US).
However, there is no evidence that in the 1985-96 period there was the increase in TFP
growth that would be expected in OECD countries if there were spillovers from ICT
investment. The UK, with the second largest share of ICT in total capital stock behind
the US, has actually seen a productivity slowdown in the last few years (Bank of
England 1999).
Regarding the Internet in particular, the US productivity uptake’s timing was too early
to be accounted for by e-commerce (contra Nezu 2000). In 1995, one estimate (from
NUA, at www.nua.ie) suggests that sales generated by the WorldWideWeb in that year
4 Greenan, Mairess and Topiol-Bensaid (2001) find no evidence of increasing computerization and
R&D over time having a significant impact on firm performance.
5 Even this uptick within the durable goods sector is, in part, the result of measurement bias (see
Schreyer 2000).
6 Gross product originating per worker in IT-using goods and services fell an average of 0.1 per cent
1990-97, compared to a 1.1 per cent rise in non-IT intensive industries (Department of Commerce
1999).
7 See also Stiroh (1998) for a similar result.5
were but US$436 million. Even in 1998, e-transactions were only worth US$43 billion
(Economist, 24 July 1999), or equivalent to 0.5 per cent of US GDP.8
Again, because of the broad definition of TFP, a number of other factors could be
behind the recent improvement in economic performance and what limited uptick in
TFP outside the durable manufacturing sector there might have been. Perhaps it is the
result of the strong dollar, unrecorded increased labour, better monetary and fiscal
policies, cheap commodities, the strength of Wall Street, low pressure on non-wage
labour costs, the Asian crisis, or unsustainable corporate and consumer borrowing
For the future, there are many bold predictions. As a result of developing Internet-based
applications for company procedures, Oracle plans to cut US$2 billion out of
US$7 billion of global corporate expenses, for example (Economist,1 1N o v e m b e r
2000). The empirical evidence to date has been less reassuring, however. Roberti (2001)
notes that savings from companies that have moved earlier and more aggressively to the
web have been smaller than expected. IBM, for example, bought US$27.7 billion
dollars of goods electronically in the first three quarters of 2000 and saved but US$247
million (or a little under one per cent) by doing so. On the sales side, 66 million
customer service transactions were handled via IBM.com, but the headcount in call
centres has remained exactly the same.
More sober evaluations of the real potential gains to e-commerce might account for the
collapse in e-commerce growth—between 1998 and the end of 2000, the FEI/Duke
Corporate Outlook Survey (www.duke.edu/~jgraham) suggests that the percentage of
sales made online by surveyed companies remained unchanged at 5 per cent.
All of this evidence suggests that the impact of the Internet to date at the micro level has
been marginal. A specific example of a widely-used technology over which the Internet
is but a marginal evolutionary advance is electronic data interchange (EDI). EDI
systems use proprietary software to connect purchaser’s and suppliers’ computers to
automate transaction and processing exchange. Such systems are already estimated to
support about US$3 trillion in economic activity in the US alone. While Internet-based
systems are estimated to have operating costs of about 1 per cent of EDI systems, the
cost of conversion to Internet-based systems is itself high enough to have discouraged
the bulk of EDI users from so far switching to the Internet (World Bank 2000). This
suggests that the marginal improvement of using the Internet over EDI is in fact not that
large.9
8 The productivity impact was also surprisingly late to be credited to straightforward computer
investments. Already by 1990, 28 per cent of business expenditure on equipment was on hardware.
Overall, corporations spent US$1.1 trillion on computer hardware between 1990-96, yet productivity
grew by only 0.8 per cent per year (Perkins and Perkins 1999). The slowing of growth in the nominal
share of computers in the economy suggests some macro evidence of a declining marginal return to
computer ownership coinciding with the expansion of the Internet. The nominal share of computer
hardware in the economy rose rapidly before 1997. Growth since 1997 has continued the unit-elastic
response to the decline in computer prices prevalent prior to 1995—the share of nominal spending on
computers has been stable since 1997 (Gordon 2000). Recent figures suggest that growth might have
slowed even below that. Company IT budget growth in the US might slip below 5 per cent this year
from about 11 per cent in 2000 (Financial Times, 4 January 2001).
9 To take an example on the B2C side, forecasters’ estimates for B2C e-commerce growth suggest that
it might reach 10 per cent of the total retail market by 2003—this is still less than today’s share of6
At the macro level, returns might be even lower than company-level returns because of
two negative externalities linked to e-commerce sites. First, the Internet allows
businesses to force other companies and individuals to perform part of the service
previously provided by the newly networked business. For example, Expedia.com
encourages the customer to search for cheaper flights through the air ticket database
rather than its travel agents. This leads to savings for Expedia, but does not necessarily
increase economic efficiency.
Second, and perhaps of greater concern to LDC companies with less access to the new
technologies, micro studies might find supra-normal returns to investment absent in
macro studies because Internet investment (by, for example, Borders.com) involves
defending market share (against Amazon.com)—so that social returns to this investment
are lower than private returns.10
The above discussion suggests at least two concerns for LDCs. First, if there is limited
evidence of a past spillover impact of investment in computers and the Internet on
economic growth in the US, and the case for a dramatic increase in productivity in the
future is at least mixed, this suggests any benefits from the Internet in LDCs are likely
to be greatly delayed and comparatively small. As we shall see, access to the capital
required to use the Internet is very limited in LDCs; present use is a fraction of that in
the developed world, and this is a state of affairs unlikely to change significantly in the
near term. In other words, the present level of usage in the United States is not
promoting growth, and this level of usage is already far higher than can be expected in
developing countries for many years to come.
A second reason for concern is that the discussion above suggests that, in the US,
moving online has become important to protect market share. If this becomes true on a
global level, those companies least equipped to move online are likely to lose market
share to those better-placed. It is likely that the least-equipped companies will be
concentrated in the developing world.
4 The Internet in LDCs
Turning back to the production of IT, as we have noted, this is the one sector of the US
economy that has seen undoubted productivity gains. However, it is not a sector that is
prevalent in many developing countries. That the picture is not totally bleak is proven
by the fact that high technology exports account for 28 per cent of East Asia’s
manufacturing exports. There is also the example of India’s thriving IT export industry.
But India is very much the exception, and most LDCs import far more high technology
equipment and services than they export. The ITU estimates that exports of
telecommunications equipment are only worth 8 per cent of imports of such equipment
in low-income and 40 per cent of imports in middle-income countries, for example (ITU
mail-order catalogues (Almasy and Wise 2000), which, for many, must be a reasonably good
substitute.
10 Winners in the battle for market share become ‘supersites’, which dominate the web. This has already
occurred in the case of news sites, for example, where the top three sites (MSNBC, CNN and the New
York Times) account for 72 per cent of all news site visits on the web (New York Times, 29 August
2001).7
2000). Overall, low-income countries are responsible for but 0.3 per cent of the world’s
high-technology exports.
A related phenomenon is that LDCs have far lower expenditures on developing new
technologies. Expenditure on R&D in low-income countries combined totalled
approximately US$5 billion in 1999, compared to the figure for the US alone of
US$234 billion. Not surprisingly, this translates into OECD dominance of world patent
applications. Some 1,114,400 patent applications were filed in low-income countries in
1998. Under 10,000 of these applications—or under one per cent—were filed by
residents. In turn, royalty and license fee payments by low-income countries were nine
times royalty receipts, whereas in the US, royalty receipts were 2.7 times payments
(calculated from World Bank 2001).
These are significant figures because it appears that the major profits in the IT sector are
made by patent owners rather than licensees (suggested by the fact that US companies
produce 56 per cent of the revenues yet garner 96 per cent of the profits from the global
IT industry [Heeks and Kenny 2001]). Perhaps because of this, evidence from LDCs
with significant IT industries does not suggest a productivity impact from that industry
of the kind seen in the US. East Asia, the developing region with the largest IT industry,
suggests no correlation between the proportion of high-tech exports in total exports and
productivity growth (APEC 2001). Overall, LDCs are largely importing goods in the IT
sectors, not inventing or even producing them. Given this is where the profits and
productivity increases of the Internet revolution appear to be concentrated, this is a
significant problem.
Turning to the potential spillover effects and wider productivity gains from use that
proponents suggest will provide the more significant long-term impact of the Internet,
LDCs appear in a weaker position to garner these benefits, as well. First is the simple
question of access to the network. Most producers and consumers in the US had
telephone and computer access prior to the expansion of the Internet, making the cost of
connectivity the purchase of a modem and an ISP account marginal. In LDCs, the
picture is markedly different. Telephone lines per capita average 2.6 per 100 people in
low-income countries as compared to 66.4 in the United States. Albouy (1999)
estimates that about 2 billion people, the vast majority in LDCs, lack access to
electricity (in rural Tanzania, it is 99.2 per cent of the population). Computer ownership
is 4.4 per thousand people in low-income economies compared to 511 per thousand in
the US (calculated from World Bank 2001).
Further, while technological change is making both network and computer access
cheaper, serving LDC populations will remain more expensive than serving OECD
populations. Fifty-nine per cent of the population in low- and middle-income countries
are rural, compared to 24 per cent in high-income economies. It is more expensive to
provide networked services such as electricity and telephony to rural areas because the
amount of infrastructure required per customer is higher than in urban areas. The
physical costs of computer and telephone access are unlikely to drop below US$1,000
even in relatively population-dense rural areas with electricity access (Kenny 2002). In
low-density areas without networked services, costs of Internet infrastructure can rise as
high as US$20,000 per computer.11 Not only is this more than 38 times the average
11 These are the costs reached in a rural access programme in Costa Rica discussed by Shakeel et al.
2001).8
income per capita of low-income countries, it also suggests that Internet infrastructure
investments in LDCs will generate lower returns in terms of network access than they
do in the OECD (where costs are far less). In turn, this might suggest lower returns to
investment in terms of economic impact, as well.
Physical access, however, is but the first, and perhaps least significant barrier to
exploitation of the new technology. This is suggested by low Internet usage rates even
where access is available in developing countries. For example, Pigato (2001) finds in a
survey of Tanzanian firms that computer usage remains very low even in firms that own
a computer (only about 20 per cent had actually computerized basic business functions
such as invoicing). Internet use was also low; amongst the 30 per cent who had access,
less than half used it frequently and only 13 per cent rated it as an effective product
promotion tool. Even in wealthier countries in East Asia, while over 90 per cent of the
populations of Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong know where to access the Internet if
they choose to, only one third to one half of the populations of these countries actually
use the technology (calculated from Rose 2001).12
The non-physical costs of Internet use might help to explain these numbers. David
(2000) estimates that in the US, only 10 per cent of the cost of computer ownership to a
company is accounted for by the purchase of the physical equipment itself—the other
90 per cent is made up of factors such as training and support. Where human capital is
rare, these non-physical costs use are likely to be an even more significant barrier to
use. General education, specific technical and language skills and the broader
institutional environment are all factors that might explain low usage rates.
Turning first to education, evidence from both the US and India suggests that those
benefiting most from IT investments are the better educated and more highly skilled—
who are being hired in greater numbers and increasing their pay differentials over
unskilled, less educated colleagues (Autor, Katz and Kreuger 1998; Lal 1996). And the
great majority of users in the developing world are from the most educated sector of the
population (in Ethiopia, 98 per cent of Internet users had a university degree in 1998
[CABECA 1998]). Yet, the stock of ‘tertiary human capital’ in LDCs, on average and as
a percentage of US stocks, is about as small as the stock of physical capital (Heeks and
Kenny 2001). Advanced education—of the greatest value in a ‘global knowledge
economy’—is rare in LDCs. Indeed, approximately one third of adults in low-income
countries cannot even read, a vital skill for meaningful use of the Internet.
Looking more specifically at skills related to the Internet, the technical skills gap is
frequently highlighted as at least as serious barrier to Internet use as lack of access to
the Internet itself (G-8 2000). The extent to which basic computer skills are lacking in
LDCs is suggested by a report from Wa in Northern Ghana that locals trained in
computer skills and management could fetch US$6,000 per year—this in a country with
an average GNP per capita of US$390 (Hirsch 1998). Further, these skills gaps are
likely to remain in the population at large—not least because, with per-student
discretionary expenditures in secondary schools running as low as twelve dollars a year,
12 As a further example regarding more advanced use of the Internet, connectivity is already common in
Argentine and Chilean firms—60 per cent of (non-micro) enterprises in Chile are connected to the
Internet as well as 87 per cent of Argentina’s SMEs. Nonetheless, only 15 per cent of Chilean firms
have their own website and only 20 per cent of Argentine firms have bought goods on line (Hilbert
2001).9
the majority of schools in developing countries could not afford to install IT labs (Grace
and Kenny 2001).
As important, there is a significant language skills gap, with perhaps one half of the
populations of the least developed countries not speaking an official language of their
own country—let alone English, the predominant language of the Internet. Language
remains a significant barrier to use, as is suggested by a study of users in Slovenia,
which found that 75 per cent of those who considered themselves fluent in English used
the Internet compared to one per cent of non-English speakers (Kenny 2002). More
generally, Guillen and Suarez (2001) find that, across country and allowing for a range
of other factors, countries where English is the official or most widely spoken language
see significantly higher Internet users per capita. This is hardly surprising given the
quality and quantity of non-English web material. In 1999, 72 per cent of websites were
in English. Conversely, the number of sites that can be found in languages such as
Quecha (spoken by 10 million people in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru) or Ibo (spoken by
15 million in Nigeria) can be counted on the fingers of one hand—and none of them
offer interactive features (Kenny 2002).
Beyond the scarcity of physical and human capital needed to benefit from the
development of the Internet, the institutional environment in LDCs is inconducive to
rapid and successful exploitation of the technology. Mirroring microeconomic results,
weak institutional capacity has been found to correlate across countries with lower
access to networks and lower host site development (Kenny 2001; Oxley and Yeung
2000).13 Weak institutions also lower consumer trust in e-commerce, perhaps the most
important factor in determining willingness to purchase online.14
Poorly developed financial systems in particular, especially when combined with poor
physical communications infrastructure, can significantly reduce the potential for e-
commerce in LDCs. For example, a recent survey of business trust in the postal service
(Kirkman et al. 2002) found that willingness to entrust the postal network with a
package worth US$100 was strongly correlated with GNP per capita, with Finland,
Japan and Switzerland at the top and Venezuela, Honduras and Nigeria at the bottom.
Regarding credit cards, results from Latin America suggest that only 28 per cent of
online transactions in the region use credit cards, compared to 54 per cent using cash—
and this is more a result of lack of trust in than lack of access to the credit card system
(Hilbert 2001). Miller (2001) argues that such weaknesses account for the fact that only
2.2 per cent of India’s Internet subscribers have engaged in e-commerce activities.
The combination of low network rollout, low skills and a poor institutional
environment, when combined with the feature of network externalities, might leave
LDCs stuck in a low-use low-utility trap regarding the Internet. With few employers,
customers or suppliers with skills access, with little relevant (or comprehensible)
content, firms and individuals will have little incentive to make little use of the
13 In a related finding, Guillen and Suarez (2001) find that a democracy index is significantly correlated
with Internet users and hosts per capita after allowing for a range of other factors.
14 Jupiter Communications (2001) found that four of the top five selection criteria for on-line purchases
were connected with recognition, trust or experience of the retailer—in fourth place was ‘I can find
bargains’.10
technology. With few firms and individuals induced to move online, the utility of the
Internet will remain low.
There is some evidence that this Internet trap exists in LDCs. Pigato (2001) argues that
the low IT usage she found in the Tanzania survey was due in part to entrepreneurs
simply not knowing how to make use of it, but also because of scale effects, suggested
by the fact that use was much higher amongst tourism enterprises, the one sector where
a considerable part of the customer base was likely to be on line.
The above factors help to explain the extent of the ‘digital divide’ in terms of access to
the Internet. Low-income countries account for 40 per cent of the world’s population
and 11 per cent of its gross national income (calculated from World Bank 2001).15 Yet,
of 242 million Internet users worldwide in 1999, only 5 million, or about 2 per cent,
were in low-income countries. Of 110,498 secure servers worldwide that use encryption
technologies in Internet transactions (commonly used for e-commerce), only 224, or 0.2
per cent, are in low-income countries.
Turning to the upside potential for LDCs to trade more and different products due to
‘the death of distance’, Venables (2001) suggests that these opportunities are much
over-rated. Many ‘knowledge goods’ remain embodied in human or physical capital,
that is still expensive (and difficult) to transport across international boundaries.
Venables also notes that as goods become weightless, they also tend to be subject to
dramatic productivity increases and price reductions. Taking the example of airline
ticketing, he notes that the major impact of ICT has been to replace labour by computer
equipment—and only secondarily to allow remaining workers to be employed in remote
locations.
Looking at the type of ‘low-tech’ service jobs that are now exportable, it is doubtful that
there are enough to make a significant difference to LDCs as a whole. Data entry (the
low-skills end of the information processing sector) is a US$800 million industry in the
United States. Imagine (generously) that the US only has its share in global GDP of the
data entry market (about 27 per cent of the world total) so that, worldwide, the industry
is worth approximately US$3 billion. This is equal to a little less than the yearly exports
of Estonia (Schware and Hume 1996; World Bank 2000b). More generously, the ILO
(2001) reports that perhaps 5 per cent of all service sector jobs in industrial countries are
‘contestable’ by LDCs—nonetheless, this totals but 12 million jobs, or 0.24 per cent of
the population of the developing world (calculated from World Bank 2001).
There is even the potential for the Internet to act as a tool for divergence in incomes
between rich and poor. The fact that general technologies are important for growth, and
that rich countries today are by and large the countries that were rich fifty or one
hundred years ago (see Kenny 1999), suggests that ‘the average’ technology probably
has a larger impact on growth prospects in wealthy countries than in poor countries
(Heeks and Kenny 2001). Venables (2001) also suggests that innovations in
communications technologies in the past have further concentrated income in a few
geographic areas.
15 The quality of that access is also significantly lower—44 per cent of Brazil’s Internet connections run
at 33kbps, for example, response time is four times longer in Latin America than in the US and packet
loss three times higher (McKinsey 2001).11
A number of studies based on US and European countries also suggest that backwards
companies and regions are benefiting less from the Internet as well, as would be
expected if network externalities and low-utility traps were at work. Indeed, the firms
that are benefiting most from the introduction of IT are those that were already thriving
in the ‘old economy’ (World Bank 2000; Doms, Dunne and Troske 1997; Greenan,
Mairess and Topiol-Bensaid 2001). At the regional level, advanced regions in Europe
have also benefited more from the rollout of communications infrastructure than
backward regions (Cornford 2001).16 Looking at production of high value-added
‘knowledge goods’ in particular, this has remained concentrated in wealthier regions in
the UK, for example, despite falling communications costs (Cornford 2001). Finally,
there is global evidence that ‘dot.com’ firms are also highly concentrated, and
concentrated in regions that were wealthy prior to their creation (Gillespie, Richardson
and Cornford 2001).
LDCs face high costs to access ICTs, a number of barriers to exploit that access, limited
opportunities if those barriers are overcome, and some threat that wider access to ICTs
might actually speed divergence, then. It is perhaps for such reasons that even studies
that find a historical link between IT investment and growth in developed countries fail
to find such a link in LDCs (see Pohjola 2001 and Meyer 2000).17
5 Estimates of the future impact of the Internet on economic growth
We have seen that a range of businesses and economists are predicting significant
savings and productivity increases from moving processes on line. We have also seen
early evidence that there is a risk that much of these savings might be swallowed up by
competing for market share, with little impact on the strength of the national economy.
This paper has presented a range of further arguments for caution in predicting a
significant positive impact of the Internet on LDC economies. Nonetheless, this section
suggests that even the more optimistic voices on the economic effects of the Internet lay
out a scenario of comparatively little impact on the course of divergence, and that
evidence from past ‘revolutions’ in transactions costs reductions support this
conclusion.
A range of estimates for OECD countries suggest an impact of e-business on growth as
small as perhaps one third of one per cent by 2005. Taking the US alone, one more
generous estimate by Goldman Sachs is perhaps 5 per cent by 2010 (Economist,1A p r i l
2000).18 More optimistic still, it has become common to assume that investments in
16 Greenan, Mairess and Topiol-Bensaid (2001), for example, find that while there is no relationship
between increasing expenditure on R&D and computerization and French firm performance, firms
that perform better tend to have higher R&D and computing expenditure.
17 Bedi’s (1999) survey on this topic could find only one study with a significant result, which found a
positive relationship that was likely to be plagued by an endogeneity bias.
18 Forrester research predicts that, by 2003, e-business will reach US$1.5 trillion, or equal to about 13
per cent of US GDP. If we assume the value added by this business being conducted online is 10 per
cent, this would increase the country’s GDP by 1.3 per cent (Economist, 30 October 1999). The
OECD is less positive in its estimates. Its most generous forecast is that, for the whole of the OECD in
2005, e-commerce will equal US$1 trillion (Nevens 1999). Again, assuming a 10 per cent impact on
value added, this suggests that by 2005, the OECD will have increased GDP thanks to e-commerce by12
telecommunications and IT, which account for the same proportion of today's capital
stock as railways did in the late nineteenth century (a little over 10 per cent), will have a
similar impact on US economic growth as is generously estimated for the railways—
around 10 per cent (although Fogle (1964) would estimate one third of that impact for
railways). If this were gained over the next twenty years, it would be at a rate of a little
under 0.5 per cent per year.
However, even assuming such a generous growth impact in the US, there are good
reasons to believe that the impact of the Internet on growth in LDCs will be much less
significant. Indeed, it is widely accepted even by Internet optimists that the impact of
the Internet on developing countries at least over the near term is likely to be smaller
than that in developed countries—and this paper presents a range of evidence
suggesting that the impact will remain muted. The consulting firm e-Marketer estimates
that e-commerce revenues of ‘the rest of the world’ (outside North America, Europe and
East Asia) will be 2 per cent of the global total in 2003, which equals US$29 billion.
Assuming that 10 per cent of revenues add to gross product, this suggests that e-
commerce will add the equivalent of Guyana’s GDP (a poor country with a population
of a little under one million) to total ‘RoW’ GDP by 2003.19 One recent global estimate
suggests that over the longer term, ‘effective’ e-commerce policies could increase Latin
America’s GDP by about US$45 billion—or about 2 per cent. However, the same
source provides other estimates that are as low as 1.2 per cent for Latin America and
one per cent for Asia (Mann, Eckert and Knight 2000).
These general estimates of the income impact of the Internet by ICT optimists are thus
very small compared to the rich-poor gap. The US’ GNP per capita is about US$30,000
compared to Sudan’s GNP per capita of about US$300, or about a 10,000 per cent
difference (World Bank 2000b). Compare this figure to the 10 per cent additional
income that the Internet might most optimistically provide.20
Taking the past as prologue, these figures should, perhaps, not come as a surprise.
Despite sharing the networking and transactions-reducing features of the Internet, and
despite human and physical capital requirements far less demanding than the Internet, it
appears that telecommunications has had a fairly limited growth impact, as well.21
Although there is some econometric evidence that increasing access to telephony has an
impact on future growth rates, the size and geographical extent of that impact is
arguable. Roller and Waverman (2000), Canning (1997), and Madden and Savage
(1998) are three recent studies that find some sort of link (although Roller and
about one-third of one per cent. See also the Economist Survey 2000 (23 September); World Bank
2000a; OECD 2000.
19 A third study by Goldman Sachs (2000) estimates that online commerce outside North America,
Europe and Asia will generate gross revenues of US$59 billion by 2003, rising to US$178 billion by
2005.
20 World Bank (2000b).
21 A similar story can be told for the railroad. Fogel’s (1964) study of the impact of the railroad on the
US economy estimates that the level of per capita income reached in the US on 1 January 1890 would
have been reached by 31 March 1890 if railroads had never been invented. The problem here, as
frequently noted, is that Fogle only looked at the static rather than the dynamic impact of the railroads
on the US economy—and those dynamic impacts could have been large, even if they are hard to
measure.13
Waverman only find that link in more advanced economies), Holtz-Eakin (1993, 1994)
and Garcia-Mila and McGuire (1992) dispute it. Even if there is a link, the evidence
suggests that it cannot be all that significant. Over the last forty years—and particularly
since the spread of mobile telephony—poor countries have seen a far more rapid growth
in telephone networks than have developed countries. Nonetheless, there has been a
divergence in income between rich and poor countries over the last forty years, and
LDC growth rates have slowed even as networks have expanded (calculated by the
author from World Bank 2001).22 As suggested at the start of this paper, given the
broad definition of technology, the impact on growth of one new invention, however
impressive that invention, is likely to be small.
6 Conclusion
This paper has taken a very narrow look at the likely impact of the Internet on
development. And it should be remembered that even this narrow look suggests that
there will be significant changes in the way business is done in LDCs—changes that
have already begun. The same transactions savings that are available in developed
counties from the Internet are available in LDCs—for example, Reliance Industries, a
chemical firm in India, has linked its major customers through an Internet-based market
exchange, reducing receivables delays by two thirds and speeding order deliveries
(Miller 2001). More broadly, the technology offers exciting possibilities in education
delivery, for improving health services or the access of the poor to the tools of
governance.
Relatedly, much of the analysis in the paper has been ‘static’—looking at the direct
impact of the Internet on the costs of doing business, not the knock-on effects that the
technology might have on creating new business models, or through its support for the
development of a better-educated workforce. The Internet is a powerful technology that
will have a long-term impact on the quality of life in developing countries.
Having said that, our record in predicting the dynamic impact of technologies on
development in the past has been very weak. To take three communications-related
examples, the railway was predicted to spark the dictatorship of the proletariat, the
telegraph was predicted to engender world peace and the television to revolutionize
education. Broadly, it appears that even while the role of technology in economic
growth cannot be questioned, the dynamic impact of a particular, invented technology is
never very large. It looks increasingly as if the impact of the computer on US
22 Regarding the role of reduced transactions costs in making LDCs more competitive in trade, evidence
regarding progress in international trade-talks suggests that this is not enough to spark LDC growth,
either. Assuming generously that the Internet might reduce transactions costs on goods and services
by perhaps 10 per cent (see Goldman Sachs 2000), compare this marginal improvement to the scale of
changes in ‘institutional technology’ over the past forty years. Looking at the impact of the GATT and
WTO trade rounds, for example, average tariffs in industrial countries fell from 40 per cent in 1947 to
5 per cent in 1988—and have fallen further since (Law Journal Extra 1996). Falling transport costs
and more rapid transport systems might have added a further 10 per cent cost reduction on top of this
(Hummels 1999, 2001). Again, despite (or perhaps because of) such dramatic improvements, LDC
income growth has fallen over that period, and fallen even further behind that of developing countries,
suggesting that reduced transactions costs alone will not allow LDCs to ‘close the gap’.14
productivity will be a good example of this. The impact has been limited so far, and
might not increase in the future.
Hard choices should be made based on an understanding of our comparative ignorance
of the potential impact of the Internet. For example, if the Internet is considered
necessary to ensure that businesses remain internationally competitive, does government
policy focus on ensuring business access at the cost of equitable access? Similarly with
education: if exploiting the Internet requires tertiary education, do governments
re-channel resources from primary education for the many to university funding for the
few? I would argue that, given the limited evidence of benefits, the great state of
uncertainty and the immediate equity costs of such actions, the answer should be to
support equitable access and primary education.
Overall, the largest determinant of the impact of the Internet in developing countries is
likely to remain the broader environment outside the information infrastructure sector.
This environment will also play by far the predominant role in determining the quality
of life of LDC populations. For this reason, Microsoft Chairman Bill Gates’ argument
about the place of direct support to the Internet in development priorities might well be
correct: ‘I am suggesting that if somebody is interested in equity that you wouldn’t
spend more than 20 per cent of your time talking about access to computers, that you’d
get back to literacy and health and things like that. So the balance that makes sense is
that more money should be spent on malaria’ (Gates 2000).23
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